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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 647 _ Filed 03/11/22 Page6of24 that [Ms. Maxwell] was not convicted of the crime described in that core, but of a crime ‘distinctly different’ from the one alleged.” United States v. Gross, No. 15-cr-769 (AJN), 2017 WL 4685111, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2017). In other words, the dispute is whether there is a substantial likelihood that the jury convicted Ms. Maxwell on Counts One, Three, and Four without finding that she intended Jane and the other victims to engage in sexual activity in New York in violation of New York law, and instead convicted her of a “distinctly different” crime based on a finding that she intended the illegal sexual activity to occur in New Mexico. Based on a plain reading of the Jury Note (Court Exhibit #15), it is substantially likely that this is exactly what happened in this case. The government once again confidently states that there is “no likelihood” that this could have occurred because the government never argued this as a theory of guilt and the jury instructions required the jury to find that Ms. Maxwell intended to violate New York law. (Opp. at 10). But that argument misses the mark entirely. Regardless of what the government did or did not argue in its summation, or what the jury instructions did or did not say about the intent requirement for Count Four, the Jury Note laid bare that the jury was confused about that element and had the mistaken belief that if it found that Ms. Maxwell intended for Jane to engage in sexual activity in New Mexico, and the other elements of Count Four were satisfied, it could convict Ms. Maxwell on Count Four without finding that she intended Jane to engage in sexual activity in New York. At that point, it was incumbent on the Court to correct the jury’s misunderstanding of an essential element of the offense with a supplemental instruction, as the defense requested. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946) (When “a jury makes explicit its difficulties [through a written inquiry,] a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy”); United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 1990) (when a jury sends a note DOJ-OGR-00010272