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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document647_ Filed 03/11/22 Page17 of 24 three required travel to New York whereas Count Five did not require interstate travel. (Opp. at 28). Yet the government still readily concedes that Counts One and Three are multiplicitous because the conduct underlying these counts is so similar. Count Five is no different.’ Indeed, it is evident from the way the government charged the S2 Indictment that the conduct charged in Count Five is part of the same conspiratorial agreement as the conduct charged in Counts One and Three. The Court will recall that Counts Five and Six, the sex trafficking counts, were added to the Indictment after the government located Carolyn and secured her as a witness. These counts are based primarily on her allegations of sexual abuse and are therefore limited to the time period from 2001-2004. But in superseding the Indictment, the government did not treat Carolyn’s allegations as a separate conspiracy. Instead, the government recognized that the abuse she described was a continuation of the same conspiracy and fully incorporated her allegations into the existing Mann Act conspiracies. For example, the government expanded the date range of Counts One and Three from 1994-1997 to 1994-2004 to include Carolyn’s abuse and added an overt act to both counts alleging that Ms. Maxwell “invited [Carolyn] to travel from Florida to a place outside of Florida with Epstein.” (Ind. 9 13e, 19e). Consistent with this charging theory, the government argued to the jury that it could consider all of the evidence related to Carolyn as evidence of the Mann Act conspiracies. (Tr. 2895) (“The first two conspiracy counts are from 1994 to 2004. Those counts are about Jane, Carolyn, and Annie.” (emphasis added)). 7 The cases cited by the government are not to the contrary. In United States v. Villa, No. 12 Cr. 40 (JBA), 2014 WL 252013 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), the District Court considered the nature of the offenses in holding that the relevant conspiracies were different but did not rely exclusively on that factor and instead based its decision on a thorough analysis of all of the Korfant factors. United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) is inapposite on this point because the relevant conspiracies were charged under two separate clauses of the general conspiracy statue and were therefore distinct conspiracies on their face, whereas the conspiracies in the Indictment in this case were all charged under the same clause. 13 DOJ-OGR-00010283