DOJ-OGR-00010317.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 649 _ Filed 03/15/22 Page11of12 LAW OFFICES OF BOBBI C. STERNHEIA\ trial ended. There is no question that Juror 50 would have known (if he didn’t know before) that that Maxwell trial was all over the press and was the subject of a massive media blitz. Far from hoping to remain anonymous, Juror 50 reveled in the attention and started posting his own messages on social media, using his actual picture and his real first name, announcing to the world that he was on the Maxwell jury. (See Motion at 20, Juror 50’s Instagram Account) (“I can now tell everyone that I was a juror on the Ghislaine Maxwell trial.”). Juror 50 was not looking to avoid notice. He was looking to soak up his 15 minutes of fame. This, again, is strong evidence of Juror 50’s bias. Whether Juror 50’s false responses were for the purpose of securing a spot on the jury or because he was deluding himself about his ability to be impartial, Juror 50’s multiple false statements on the questionnaire and to the Court add to the bases for finding that he should have been struck for cause. See Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (“Even when prospective jurors are dishonest for reasons other than a desire to secure a seat on the jury, dishonest answers to voir dire questions indicate that a juror is unwilling or unable to apply the law as instructed by the court to the evidence presented by the parties and, therefore, are indicative of a lack of impartiality[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Juror 50 admitted that he was perfectly willing to disregard the Court instructions. In light of his statements that he “flew through” the questionnaire, the Court asked Juror 50 whether he was concerned about following the Court’s instructions. (Tr. 18). Juror 50 responded, “Absolutely not.” (/d.). When the Court asked him again, he again responded “No, I really ... this is a terrible excuse, but I didn’t really think I would be chosen.” (/d.). A willingness to disregard the Court’s instructions shows an inability to serve as an unbiased juror and raises independent grounds for a for cause challenge. See Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 11 DOJ-OGR-00010317