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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document653_ Filed 04/01/22 Page 29 of 40 be discussed at trial would [not] interfere with [his] ability to be fair or impartial as a juror in the case.” See Hearing Tr. at 27.7 Accordingly, even if Juror 50 had disclosed his abuse during jury selection, the Court would not have granted a hypothetical challenge for cause, as consistent with other prospective jurors who disclosed similar experiences. This is so because our system of trial by jury does not exclude individuals with experiences similar to the issues at trial when those individuals can serve fairly and impartially. This Court has presided over a murder trial in which a juror who had a family member murdered was not struck for cause. So too victims of fraud serve faithfully in fraud trials and individuals who have been discriminated against have served without bias in discrimination trials. So the critical question, as for any juror, is whether the juror has the ability to decide the case based only on the evidence presented in court, not extraneous information, and without bias, prejudice, or sympathy. See U.S. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970). Juror 50 repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed his ability to do just that. And for all the reasons articulated above, the Court found that testimony credible. To imply or infer that Juror 50 was biased—simply because he was himself a victim of sexual abuse in a trial related to sexual abuse and sex trafficking, and despite his own credible testimony under the penalty of perjury, establishing that he could be an even-handed and impartial juror—would be tantamount to concluding that an individual with a history of sexual abuse can never serve as a fair and Tn her pre-hearing briefing, the Defendant raises that out of 694 prospective jurors, the parties jointly agreed to excuse 67 of the 114 prospective jurors who answered “yes (self)” to Question 48, and the “Court granted” the Defendant’s challenges to 23 and the Government’s challenges to 2 additional prospective jurors who answered “yes (self).” Maxwell Br. at 9-10. But that is a mischaracterization. First, a significant number of those prospective jurors stated that they could not be fair and impartial for a variety of reasons. Second, and as noted above, all of those excusals “resulted from the parties’ agreement, not from the court’s analysis of each challenged juror’s ability to be impartial.” Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 439. “The question now is whether [Juror 50’s] omission reveals a bias sufficient to support a for-cause challenge.” Jd. As explained above, it does not. 29 DOJ-OGR-00010352