DOJ-OGR-00010362.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document653_ Filed 04/01/22 Page 39 of 40 Even if confined to the questionnaire session, the Defendant argues that Juror 50’s “willingness to disregard the Court’s instructions” during the questionnaire “shows an inability to serve as an unbiased juror.” Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 11. She relies on Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), as her sole support. But Dyer stands for the distinct proposition that a juror who deliberately lies, and thus commits perjury, cannot be trusted to “stand in judgment of other people’s veracity.” Jd. at 983. It does not support that an uncareful and inattentive prospective juror who mistakenly provides an inaccurate response during jury selection is biased. As explained above, the Court does not conclude that Juror 50 committed perjury and lied in an effort to be on the jury. Accordingly, the Court rejects granting the Defendant’s motion on this basis. In sum, the Court concludes that the evidence in the record does not support finding that Juror 50 was biased. Juror 50’s sworn testimony did not reveal actual partiality. And Juror 50 was not impliedly or inferably biased. He was neither a victim nor otherwise involved in the actual crimes. Nor does he have any sort of relationship with any of the parties or case participants. And as consistent with other jurors who answered “yes (self)” to Question 48, the Court would not have granted a for-cause challenge on the basis of Juror 50’s personal history of sexual abuse. That Juror 50 was distracted during the questionnaire does not reveal that he was biased or failed to follow the Court’s instructions during voir dire and the trial. Prong two of the demanding McDonough inquiry is not satisfied. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Juror 50 testified credibly and truthfully at the post-trial hearing. His failure to disclose his prior sexual abuse during the jury 39 DOJ-OGR-00010362