DOJ-OGR-00010425.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 662 Filed 06/15/22 Page 8of29 In each of these cases, the ex post facto violation resulted from an increase in the applicable statutory penalty, as opposed to the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines. However, the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is also a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply a later version of the Guidelines that increases the recommended sentencing range if the criminal conduct was complete before the later version took effect. See Peugh, 569 US. at 532-33 (“[T]here is an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense.”). An ex post facto violation is an ex post facto violation regardless of whether the increased penalty resulted from a change in the statute or a change in the Guidelines. Hence, if the end date of the offense conduct dictates whether it is permissible to apply a later Guidelines book consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause, the jury must find that fact. Here, the S2 Indictment alleges only that the criminal conduct ended “in or about 2004” and does not specify whether the conduct continued into November and December 2004. Nor was the jury asked to make a specific finding as to the end date of the offense conduct. Because the jury did not make the necessary factual finding, the Court cannot apply the 2004 Guidelines and must instead apply the 2003 Guidelines.° B. The Trial Record Is Insufficient to Support a Finding that the Offense Conduct Continued Past November 1, 2004. Even if the Court can determine the end date of the offense conduct for Guidelines purposes, the record does not support a finding that the conduct extended past November 1, 3 Although the issue is properly framed as an ex post facto issue, it would also violate Ms. Maxwell’s Sixth Amendment rights for the Court, and not the jury, to determine when the offense conduct ended. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Julian, 427 F.3d at 482 (failure to have the jury determine the end date of the conspiracy for ex post facto purposes was a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights). DOJ-OGR-00010425