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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document670 _ Filed 06/22/22 Page 21 of55 to resolve, and not the jury. Fusco, 560 F. App’x at 45-46 (citing United States v. Norris, 281 F.3d 357, 369 (2d Cir. 2002)). Lacking any authority for her argument, the defendant cites Peugh and offers her own sweeping conclusion that, essentially, the Sixth Amendment requires that all Ex Post Facto issues be resolved by juries. But as the Supreme Court explained in Peugh, “the Sixth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause inquiries are analytically distinct” and “[nJothing that we say today ‘undo[es]’ the holdings of Booker, Rita, Gall, Kimbrough, or our other recent sentencing cases.” Peugh, 569 U.S. at 549-50. It is thus unsurprising that the defendant has not located a single case, anywhere in the nation, that has concluded, in the nine years since Peugh was decided, that the determination of which Guidelines Manual to apply implicates the Sixth Amendment. Thus, even after Peugh, a sentencing judge’s fact-finding authority continues to include the authority to find when an offense ended for purposes of deciding which Guidelines Manual to apply. 2. The Sex Trafficking Conspiracy Continued to 2005 The Indictment charged that the defendant participated in a conspiracy “from at least in or about 1994, up to and including at least in or about 2004,” and that is exactly what the Government proved at trial. (Dkt. No. 187 at 1). There can be no question that the evidence establishes that the conspiracy ran past November 1, 2004, consistent with the charging language in the Indictment. At trial, Carolyn testified that she continued to perform sexualized massages for Epstein when she was 18, which was in 2005. Carolyn’s birth certificate was admitted at trial as GX 11. Carolyn turned 18 in 2005, which is after November 1, 2004, the day that the 2004 Manual went into effect. In particular, Carolyn gave the following testimony: 19 DOJ-OGR-00010556