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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document670 _ Filed 06/22/22 Page 26 of55 “one involving five or more knowing participants” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, there is ample basis in the record to impose this enhancement. The text of U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a) calls for the application of its enhancement if “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that” either “involved five or more participants,” or “was otherwise extensive.” The defense correctly points out that Application Note 2 to this Guidelines provides, “To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. An upward departure may be warranted, however, in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization.” Application Note 1 defines a “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” Despite those Application Notes, however, the Government is not aware of any Second Circuit case requiring that, where the enhancement turns on the “otherwise extensive” prong, rather than the “five or more participants” prong, the defendant must supervise a knowing participant. Indeed, the defense fails to cite a single case holding that the “otherwise extensive” prong requires that the defendant supervised a knowing participant. Instead, the Second Circuit has articulated three factors that sentencing courts should consider when evaluating whether the “otherwise extensive” enhancement applies. See United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds, United States v. Kennedy, 233 F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Kent, 821 F.3d at 369 (applying Carrozzella factors); United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146, 156-58 (2d Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Rubenstein, 403 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Rittweger, 274 F. App’x 78, 24 DOJ-OGR-00010561