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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page5of21 a deferred prosecution agreement)) “Congress crafted the CVRA to recognize the harm and anguish suffered by victims of crime. This is why Congress made the statutory rights under the CVRA permissively accessible. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).” Id. Moreover, “[b]ecause victim status can be argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to look beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the [drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the plea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference...that [the defendant’s] paramilitary organization...employed violence and force as part of its method of operation.” /d. It is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the trial phase where, of course, a defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected by the requirement that the government prove guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in determining the “crime victim” issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional standard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial—preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 FSupp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Purported victims under the CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing Jn re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 FSupp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021) (same). DOJ-OGR-00010696