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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 Filed 06/25/22 Page9of21 [at sentencing] broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come come.”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (explaining that in order to determine an “appropriate sentence” judges need “the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.”). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not limit the evidence that the court can consider at sentencing. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1240 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Fennel, 65 E.3d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Cofield, No. 17-CR-610, 2019 WL 4879331, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2019). The information relied on post-conviction must only have “some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” United States v. Shine, No. 17-CR-28-FPG-JJM, 2020 WL 32937, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020) quoting United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 701 (2d Cir. 2007). Of particular importance in confirming the expansive power of federal courts at sentencing is a broad federal provision—18 U.S.C. § 3661—which establishes that “xo limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted. of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence” (emphasis added). The critical words, “no limitation,” grant a sentencing court extremely broad discretionary authority to consider wide-ranging unlimited information about Maxwell’s “background, character, and conduct”—crucial information clearly possessed by Sarah and Elizabeth. The Second Circuit has recognized the broad scope of this provision. In United States v. Morrison, 778 F.3d 396, 400-01 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit noted that section 3661 DOJ-OGR-00010700