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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page18 of 25 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan November 22, 2021 Page 18 F. Compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive. Three of the motions argue that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive because the accusers were guaranteed confidentiality under the EVCP Protocol. EVCP Mot. at 9-12; Accuser-2 Mot. at 4-6; Witness-3 Mot. at 2-3. The government does not make such an argument. Gov. Mot. at 1-6. Some motions even imply that the confidentiality of the materials is reason enough to quash the subpoena. Accuser-2 Mot. at 4-6; Witness-3 Mot. at 2-3. First, even if the materials are confidential, this Court cannot quash the subpoena on that basis alone. Rule 17 addresses the process for subpoenaing “personal or confidential information about a victim.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). If confidential materials couldn’t be subpoenaed, Rule 17(c)(3) would be superfluous. In fact, under the express language of Rule 17, the only difference between a subpoena for confidential information and a subpoena for non-confidential information is that the former can be issued “‘only by court order” with notice to the victim. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). The terms of Rule 17 do not require a heightened justification before a defendant can subpoena confidential information, and they do not demand special treatment for motions to quash when confidential information is at issue. /d.° ® Courts in this district have even authorized defense subpoenas when the information sought is arguably privileged. E.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 753 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying motion to quash defense subpoena for tax returns even though the returns might be privileged, saying “cases demonstrate . . . a potential exception to the tax return privilege where, as here, the interests in truth and a criminal defendant’s rights are both implicated’’). DOJ-OGR-00011441