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65a legislative history indicating that Congress intended to apply § 3283 to a wide range of crimes against children. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60; Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196. The purposes underlying the categorical approach do not apply here either. For statutes dealing with prior convictions, “[t]he categorical approach serves ‘practical’ purposes: It promotes judicial and adminis- trative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after the fact.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2013). In the context of § 3283, there is no prior conviction to assess, and the jury will determine in the first instance whether “the defendant engaged in the applicable abusive conduct.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell nonetheless contends that using a_ case-specific approach for § 3283 would be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some additional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least, when the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not justify setting aside the statute’s language and apparent purpose. Maxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this Court to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended the limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that case, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing was not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as required by the statute. Id. at 221.Then, as DOJ-OGR-00000128