DOJ-OGR-00000129.tif

66a an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that the offense did not require fraud as an “essential ingredient.” Jd. at 222. It reached that conclusion in large part because the statute’s legislative history made clear that Congress intended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216. As the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in the enacting in the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. “In passing recent statutes related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress ‘evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.”” Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges’ holding— legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead, both the statute’s plan meaning and its legislative history suggest it should apply more broadly. Based on the statute’s text, context, and history, the Court follows Weingarten and concludes that the appropriate inquiry is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor on the facts alleged in this case. There is no question that they did. The Court thus concludes that § 3283 governs the limitations period for the charges here. 2. The 2003 amendment to the statute of limitations applies to these offenses Maxwell next contends that because the charged conduct took place before the PROTECT Act’s enactment, that statute did not lengthen the statute of limitations applicable to her alleged offenses. Here too, the Second DOJ-OGR-00000129