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67a Circuit has provided guidance in its decision in Weingarten. Although the court did not provide a definitive answer there, it explained that the view Maxwell now takes conflicts with established principles of retroactivity and the decisions of at least two other circuit courts. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58 & n.8; see Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 488 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has set out a_ two-step framework to determine whether a federal statute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past conduct, courts must so apply it. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past conduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. The Court begins with Landgraf’s first step. To assess a statute’s meaning here, courts must consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, including the statute’s history and structure. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004). Section 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act, broadly states that “[nlo statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.” The statute lacks an express retroactivity clause, but courts have held that no such clause is necessary, including for this particular statute. See Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d at 923. The statute’s plain language unambiguously requires DOJ-OGR-00000130