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72a and his mother, one individual Maxwell believes worked with one of the alleged victims in this case, and a police detective who investigated Epstein in Florida. She contends they all would have provided exculpatory testimony were they alive today. Courts have generally found that vague assertions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell provides no indication of what many of these potential witnesses might have testified to. The testimony she suggests the detective might have offered—that witnesses in the Palm Beach investigation did not identify Maxwell by name—is propensity evidence that does nothing to establish her innocence of the charged offenses. There are also serious doubts under all of the relevant circumstances that a jury would have found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf. See United States v. Spears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999). Maxwell’s arguments that the indictment should be dismissed because of the possibility of missing witnesses, failing memories, or lost records fail for similar reasons. These are difficulties that arise in any case where there is extended delay in bringing a prosecution, and they do not justify dismissing an indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 US. 307, 325-26 (1971); see United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). Finally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice from the pretrial publicity this case has garnered. Maxwell contends that lengthy public interest in this case has transformed her reputation from that of Epstein’s friend to a co-conspirator. And she also DOJ-OGR-00000135