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be N Ww ws Oo OY ~] oO WO Ww a OY 20 21 22 23 24 25 Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 763 Filed 08/10/22 Page 21 of 197 2562 LCF Cmax1 repeatedly relied on rule 613(a), which uses different language and is about impeachment by prior inconsistent statement on cross examination, not introduction of a prior statement as extrinsic evidence as it seeks to do here. So the opportunity to explain the statement should consist of something more than just the opportunity to admit or deny making the statement. That's right in Miller, 28 Federal Practice and Procedure Evidence, Section 6205, Note 1, Second Edition 2021. Citing a Seventh Circuit case and an Eleventh Circuit case. Now I'm going to quote from Gulani again. A trial court has discretion to require satisfaction of the latter requirement before th xtrinsic evidence is offered or alternatively to permit it to be satisfied by recalling the witness after the extrinsic evidence is received. In a case called Surdow, S-u-r-d-o-w, the Second Circuit stated that the district court has broad discretion to exclude extrinsic impeachment evidence that was not revealed while the witness was on the stand or at least before the witness was permitted to leave the court. That's United States v. Surdow, 121 F.Appx. 898 (2d Cir. 2005), collecting authorities. Therefore, the Court will sustain the government's objection as to all proposed prior inconsistent statements to which the witness was not presented with the statement to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 DOJ-OGR-00014127