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Casea20-2200830-PAE maboduhent1280212 074i] ab 3 2702/24 ag Pagel LH of 26 3. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Maxwell’s Motion for a New Trial Maxwell contends that she was deprived of her constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury because Juror 50 failed to accurately respond to several questions related to his history of sexual abuse as part of the jury questionnaire during jury selection. Following a special evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Maxwell’s motion for a new trial. We review a District Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.”” We have been extremely reluctant to “haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.” 28 While courts can “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a), they should do so “sparingly” and only in “the most extraordinary circumstances.” A district court “has 2 See Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1996). “[W]e are mindful that a judge has not abused her discretion simply because she has made a different decision than we would have made in the first instance.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001). We have repeatedly explained that the term of art “abuse of discretion” includes errors of law, a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or “a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 28 United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983). 2 Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134. 17 DOJ-OGR-00014867