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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 35 Filed 07/29/20 Page 2 of 5 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan July 29, 2020 Page 2 of course, has not had access to the discovery materials) to anticipate and respond to government hypotheticals regarding what the discovery might contain, and how language might address such hypotheticals. But that is not the standard. The defense submits that when the relevant privacy interests are appropriately considered, it should not be restricted from publicly referencing individuals who have chosen to publicly identify themselves. Accordingly, the defense has proposed that the protective order include the following language: “Nor does this Order prohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing individuals who have spoken on the public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation — criminal or otherwise — relating to Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell.” (Dkt. 29, Ex. A ¥ 6). In the present context, many of the alleged victims have chosen to identify themselves by name in numerous public fora, including: self-identifying and speaking on the record in criminal proceedings in the Jeffrey Epstein case and this case; as named plaintiffs in civil suits against Ms. Maxwell and others; in on-the-record interviews with media and tabloid publications and newspaper articles; publishing memoirs; appearing on air in Netflix documentaries and other television and film productions; appearing in YouTube videos; and making, in their own name, all manner of social media posts. Indeed, a Google search will reveal any number of videos and articles in which alleged victims not only identify themselves, but make specific allegations against Ms. Maxwell. As a matter of common sense, and under the law, such persons do not have any privacy interest that needs to be addressed by the proposed order. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (noting, in a case where the identity of a minor rape victim was disclosed in publicly filed indictments, that “the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record.”). Yet, the government asserts that such persons nevertheless have “significant privacy interests” (Gov’t Resp. at 1), and proposes the much more limited formulation: “This Order does not prohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing individuals who have spoken by name on the public record in this case” — i.e., in United States vy. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN). (Dkt. 33, Ex. A § 5 (emphasis added)). As a practical matter, the government’s proposed language would permit the defense to publicly reference a total of one person — the individual who spoke under her own name at Ms. Maxwell’s bail hearing. (See Tr. at 40). It would not include the 11 alleged victims who spoke or submitted letters under their own names at the August 27, 2019 hearing in United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19-CR-00490-RMB, even though five of those individuals made allegations against Ms. Maxwell. (See Dkt. 53 at 43-44, 55, 56, 57, 58). It would not include the four individuals who have civilly sued Ms. Maxwell under their own names alleging conduct similar to that alleged in the indictment. Nor would it include numerous other individuals, described above, who have spoken out publicly to the press or on social media and made accusations against Ms. Maxwell. Indeed, the government’s proposed language is even more restrictive than what they previously agreed to in the Epstein case, which allowed Epstein’s counsel to publicly reference individuals who had identified themselves in DOJ-OGR-00001686