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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 47 Filed 08/21/20 Page 2 of 4 Honorable Alison J. Nathan August 21, 2020 Page 2 that “[r]ecords, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand-jury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.” Relatedly, the exhibits at issue—all of which pertain to several ex parte applications made by the Government—have previously been ordered to kept under seal by the relevant judicial officers, who have made the requisite findings to warrant sealing. The requested redactions and sealing would thus be necessary to ensure compliance with those sealing orders and is justified based upon them.” Cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979) (“Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public; and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye. The rule of grand jury secrecy ... is an integral part of our criminal justice system.”). Assuming without agreeing that these materials constitute “judicial documents” within the meaning of First Amendment right-of-access jurisprudence, such a determination would not be dispositive. The First Amendment presumptive right of access applies to civil and criminal proceedings and “protects the public against the government’s arbitrary interference with access to important information.” N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. (“NYCTA”), 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Circuit has applied two different approaches when deciding whether the First Amendment right applies to particular material. The “experience-and-logic” approach asks “both whether the documents have historically been open to the press and general public and whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second approach—employed when analyzing judicial documents related to judicial proceedings covered by the First Amendment right—asks whether the documents at issue “‘are derived from or are a necessary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceedings.” /d. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Even when it applies, the First Amendment right creates only a presumptive right of access, and the “presumption is rebuttable upon demonstration that suppression ‘is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’” Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 510(1984)) (internal citation omitted). “What offends the First Amendment is the attempt to [exclude the public] without sufficient justification,” NYCTA, 684 F.3d at 296, not the simple act of exclusion itself. Thus, the presumptive right of access may be overcome by “specific, on-the-record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124. > The only exceptions to those sealing orders are the permission contained in a certain order issued in April 2019, namely that the order itself may be provided to the recipient of a subpoena, and, pursuant to separate permissions the Government has obtained in connection with its discovery obligations, that the entirety of the relevant filings may be provided to the defendant as discovery in this criminal case. DOJ-OGR-00001738