DOJ-OGR-00001796.jpg
Extracted Text (OCR)
Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 64 Filed 10/14/20 Page 2 of 6
The Honorable Alison J. Nathan
October 14, 2020
Page 2
A. Applicable Law
1. Brady
“Under Brady and its progeny, ‘the Government has a constitutional duty to disclose
favorable evidence to the accused where such evidence is ‘material’ either to guilt or to
punishment.’” United States v. Certified Envtl. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Favorable evidence” that
must be disclosed for purposes of Brady “includes not only evidence that tends to exculpate the
accused, but also evidence that is useful to impeach the credibility of a government witness,” id.,
also known as “Giglio material,” as well as any statements of witnesses “which are contradictory
or inconsistent with the government’s theory of the case.” United States v. Harris, No. 00 Cr. 105
(RPP), 2000 WL 1273720, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419
(1995).
2. Rule 16
Rule 16 provides, in pertinent part:
Upon a defendant's request, the government must permit the
defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is
within the government's possession, custody, or control and. . . the
item is material to preparing the defense[.]
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). Evidence is material under Rule 16 if it “could be used to counter
the government’s case or to bolster a defense.” United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d
Cir. 1993). “The materiality standard [of Rule 16] normally is not a heavy burden; rather,
evidence is material as long as there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in
uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting
impeachment or rebuttal.” United States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Rule 16(d)(1) provides that a party may seek a protective order from the court to “deny,
restrict, or defer discovery” upon a showing of “good cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). To
establish good cause, the party must show “that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific
and serious injury.” United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations
omitted). A finding of harm “must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential
harm, not on conclusory statements.” /d. (citations omitted).
DOJ-OGR-00001796
Extracted Information
Document Details
| Filename | DOJ-OGR-00001796.jpg |
| File Size | 857.9 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 94.5% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 2,654 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-03 16:16:11.096308 |