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Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page12 of 24 14. When applying the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court has “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise has consistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this collateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291... .”); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To the extent that the [protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials exchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal.’’); see also HL. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The district court’s denial of modification [of a protective order] does not fall within the ‘collateral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant does not have ‘an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery,’” such protective orders do not amount to an impermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at 25 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)). Even where a litigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant’s right to release documents outside of criminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right can await final judgment on the underlying charges” because the “purported right 11 DOJ-OGR-00019354