DOJ-OGR-00019382.jpg

Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page16 of 23 right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-04, 213 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction where district court improperly refused to excuse potential juror who admitted bias based upon knowledge of defendant’s previous acquittal). Thus, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury would not “be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial,” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)), and, as such, the Order does not meet the third criterion for appealability of a collateral order. See Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (defendant’s interests “can be adequately vindicated upon appeal from a final judgment” through “a new trial... or whatever additional remedies are necessary”). 21. Simply put, the Order denying Maxwell’s motion to amend the Protective Order is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Maxwell complains that if she cannot use criminal discovery materials in civil litigation then there is a risk that certain filings in the civil cases may be unsealed that otherwise would have remained sealed. Maxwell apparently believes such a result would risk prejudicing her trial rights in the criminal case. If such materials are unsealed in the civil case, and if Maxwell believes that unsealing causes her prejudice at her criminal trial, Maxwell will have a full opportunity to raise that issue in the criminal case. To the extent Maxwell is concerned that unsealing in the civil case might permit the Government to oppose any motion challenging the unsealing 16 DOJ-OGR- 00019382