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Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page22 of 58 portion of the appeal that challenged the protective order’s bar on disclosure of information the defendant acquired from the government prior to the litigation. Jd. at 798. This Court distinguished the differing results based on the breadth of the protective order’s ban. Jd. As this Court said, “to the extent that the order prohibits Pappas from disclosure of information he acquired from the Government prior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating discovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its restraint.” Jd. (citing United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1993)). Beyond standing for the proposition that interlocutory appeals are the exception and not the rule (which Ms. Maxwell doesn’t dispute), Pappas has nothing to add to the analysis here. Even strictly construing the three requirements for collateral order jurisdiction, see Will, 546 U.S. at 349, the order here meets the test. The balance of the government’s argument against jurisdiction misunderstands Ms. Maxwell’s position. For example, according to the government, “it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in this appeal have been finally resolved.” Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell’s argument, says the government, is “primarily focused on attacking the legitimacy of the 17 DOJ-OGR-00019421