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Casecl ZDAPCOO SROs ATE (ide WH Ert/ 362 CF iRAB62A18/Peg KtyeiS| 867 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan July 28, 2020 Page 5 a provision stating that it did not prohibit defense counsel from publicly referencing individuals who had spoken on the public record in /itigation relating to Jeffrey Epstein. Jd. 74. Here, defense counsel seeks permission to publicly identify any individuals who have self-identified as victims of either the defendant or Epstein “to the media or in public fora, or in litigation”—a vastly broader allowance. Indeed, as a comparison, none of the hypothetical examples described above would have been subject to public naming and identification under the Epstein protective order, but every single one would be under the defendant’s proposed order in this case. Additionally, beyond the differences in the language itself, there are two significant differences between the circumstances of the Epstein prosecution and this case. First, at the time the Epstein protective order was entered, there were exceptionally few victims who had identified themselves by name in litigation. Accordingly, the practical application of that provision was extremely limited. Second, and related, in the time between when the Epstein protective order was entered and the indictment in this case, many more victims have made public statements about their victimization at the hands of Epstein, and the defendant, on their own terms and in their own ways, including by exercising their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act in the context of the dismissal of the indictment against Jeffrey Epstein following his suicide. Those victims could not possibly have predicted, much less chosen, that their names would be publicly broadcast by defense counsel in connection with a subsequent criminal case. Victims should be able to continue to come forward, in the ways and in the venues they themselves choose, without fear of reprisal, shaming, or other consequence arising from having their identities broadcast by defense counsel in this case. In sum, the requested modification to the Government’s proposed order sought by the defendant is contrary to precedent and the compelling privacy interests of victims. Moreover, it is without basis in fact or law, and, despite the Government’s repeated requests for clarity, the defendant and defense counsel have offered no legitimate reason for their desire to be able to publicly identify any number of victims, in the context of this criminal case and elsewhere, other than a minimal, conclusory statement, without factual examples or legal support.? At bottom, the defendant and her counsel seek an unlimited ability to name victims and witnesses publicly, for no discernible reason, and without justification or legal basis. The victims of Ghislaine Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein have suffered enough, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, applicable law, and common decency compel far more protection of their privacy interests here than the defense proposal would afford. B. The Defendant’s Demand that the Government Restrict Use of its Own Documents The defendant and her counsel also ask the Court to impose restrictions upon the Government in its use, through potential witnesses and their counsel, of documents it currently possesses, beyond the already-extensive restrictions and protections applicable to the > To the extent defense counsel attempts to provide such examples or arguments for the first time in a reply filing, the Government respectfully requests leave to reply to those examples or arguments. App.060 DOJ-OGR-00019519