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Casedl ADAH SROs ATEN (dc MH Ert/ 362 Ci 6 2A18/Peg Katyet6l 867 The Honorable Alison J. Nathan July 28, 2020 Page 6 Government.’ The defendant cites not a single example in any district court in the country where such a restriction has been imposed in a protective order. Indeed, it is nonsensical for a protective order to require limitations of the Government in its use of material already in its possession so that the Government may provide a defendant with discovery. The defendant’s attempt to refuse to agree to receive discovery unless the Government agrees to additional restrictions upon the use of its own materials should be rejected. As an initial matter, the Government’s use of materials it has gathered through its investigation, including through the grand jury process, search warrants, interviews, and voluntary disclosures, is already subject to a wide range of restrictions, including Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other policies of the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. In this case, consistent with the Government’s customary practice, and as the Government has informed defense counsel, the Government has no intention of providing witnesses, victims or their counsel with the entirety of discovery produced to the defendant, nor anything even close to that. Indeed, consistent with its standard practice, the Government rarely provides any third party, including a witness, with any material they did not already possess. While the Government does more commonly show a witness materials in connection with proffers or trial preparation, the Government rarely if ever shows a_ witness material she has not already seen, does not have personal knowledge of, or would not have some specific reason to opine upon. Practically speaking, therefore, the concerns defense counsel raises about future use in civil litigation are not likely to occur. Nevertheless, a criminal protective order is not the appropriate forum for the defendant to demand restrictions on the Government’s use of its own materials. To the contrary, as noted above, many of those restrictions are already established by rule and law—standards the defendant makes no suggestion the Government has failed to adhere to in this case. Moreover, the Government as a whole, including those beyond the prosecutors on this case, may have obligations that would conflict with such language in a protective order. For example, the Government has obligations under various statutory and regulatory regimes, including but not limited to the Freedom of Information Act and Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), that cannot be bargained away through a protective order. Indeed, the Government can represent that the Department of Justice has received both FOJA and Jouhy requests in connection with this investigation, requests to which the Department has a legal obligation to respond appropriately. The Government respectfully submits it would be inappropriate for the defendant to seek—or the Court to order—language in a protective order that conflicts with or supersedes those obligations. Tellingly, the defendant cites no authority or precedent for her request regarding this issue. By contrast, to the extent the defendant intends to produce reciprocal discovery to the Government, it may in that case be appropriate to limit the Government’s use, or third parties’ use, 4 Specifically, the defendant’s proposed protective order differs from the Government’s in that it adds a paragraph, its paragraph 3, proposing restrictions upon the Government and its potential witnesses, and their counsel, as well as adding language to its paragraph 5, which is Government paragraph 4, further restricting potential government witnesses and their counsel. App.061 DOJ-OGR-00019520