DOJ-OGR-00019596.jpg

Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Paged of 15 Ms. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts with another Article III judge. The government argues there is no jurisdiction for this Court to consider this appeal. Doc. 37. Quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, the government says the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted “with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Doc. 37 at 8. According to the government, in criminal cases the doctrine applies only to orders denying a bond, orders denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy ground, orders denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech and Debate Clause, and orders permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial. Doc. 37 at 9. The government is wrong. To be sure, this appeal does not concern one of the four types of orders identified by the government. But that doesn’t mean the appeal isn’t proper under the collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it satisfies each of the doctrine’s three requirements: Judge Nathan’s order (1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349. DOJ-OGR-00019596