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Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page20 of 37 14 protective order’); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors, including mem- bers of the press, appealing order denying motion to modify protective order in civil litigation to allow third parties access to sealed filings, after parties to the lit- igation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those cases was founded on the principle that when interve- nors seek access to sealed records, “orders denying ac- cess are final as to the intervenors.” Lugosch v. Pyra- mid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Once the courts in those cases de- nied the intervenors’ motions to modify protective or- ders, there was nothing left for those intervenors to lit- igate. Here, by contrast, Judge Nathan’s Order did not end the entire litigation as to Maxwell. To the con- trary, Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in December 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021. When considering interlocutory appeals from rul- ings on protective orders governing a criminal defend- ant’s use of discovery materials, by contrast, this Court has concluded it lacks jurisdiction. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Maxwell cites no case in which this Court has found jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an order regulating the use of materials a criminal defendant received during litiga- tion, and her efforts to distinguish Pappas and Capar- ros fall short. Pappas concluded that where a protec- tive order “prohibits ... disclosure of information [a de- fendant] acquired from the Government prior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating discovery documents and should be appeal- able because of the breadth of its restraint.” Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added). But that is not the DOJ-OGR-00019627