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Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page22 of 37 16 judgment appeal whether publicity biased trial ju- rors); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-04, 213 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction where district court improperly refused to excuse potential juror who admitted bias based upon knowledge of defendant’s previous acquittal). Accordingly, like the protective or- der in Caparros, the Order here will still be reviewable on appeal after entry of final judgment. In evaluating Maxwell’s appeal, the Court should “not engage in an individualized jurisdictional in- quiry,” but instead focus “on the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107. The Order declining to modify the Protective Order is not subject to interlocutory appeal as “[p]rotective orders that only regulate materials exchanged between the parties incident to litigation, like most discovery or- ders, are neither final orders, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor injunctions, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Maxwell nevertheless asks this Court to engage in an individualized jurisdictional inquiry to justify her immediate appeal. Contrary to Maxwell’s claims, the Order does not meet the third criterion of the standard for identifying immediately appealable collateral or- ders, which requires that the order being appealed from be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a fi- nal judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522. She likens her claim here to an appeal of an order denying a motion to reduce bail, arguing that her ap- peal “will become moot if review awaits conviction and sentence.” (Br. 13 (quotation omitted)). But that is not so. In an order denying a motion to reduce bail, the DOJ-OGR-00019629