DOJ-OGR-00019628.jpg

Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page21 of 37 15 type of protective order at issue here. To the contrary, the Protective Order in this case expressly provides that its provisions “shall not be construed as prevent- ing disclosure of any information, with the exception of victim or witness identifying information, that is publicly available or obtained by the Defendant or her Defense Counsel form a source other than the Govern- ment.” (A. 84-85). Instead, the Protective Order “im- posed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materi- als exchanged in the course of pending litigation” and, like the similar provision in the Pappas protective or- der, is therefore “not subject to appeal” prior to entry of final judgment. Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Caparros is similarly analogous. That case declined to find jurisdiction over a similar order for several rea- sons, including because “[t]he purported right at issue is not related to any right to stand trial.” Caparros, 800 F.2d at 26. The Court also concluded that the protec- tive order in that case would be reviewable on appeal after final judgment and emphasized that the defend- ant would not suffer any “grave harm ... if the order is not immediately reviewed.” Jd. So too here. Maxwell has not articulated any serious injury she will suffer if this Court dismisses her appeal. The only theoretical harm might be prejudicial pretrial publicity arising from the unsealing of filings in a civil case. Should any prejudicial publicity arise, though, Maxwell will be fully able to raise that issue on appeal after the entry of final judgment in her criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether public- ity biased the venire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating on post- DOJ-OGR-00019628