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Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page28 of 37 ae to vacate a protective order); S.E.C. v. The Street.com, 273 F.3d 222, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing the dis- trict court’s order lifting its protective order covering deposition testimony for abuse of discretion). “A dis- trict court abuses or exceeds the discretion accorded to it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision—though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the District Court is vested with broad discretion to oversee the criminal discovery process, including en- tering protective orders “for good cause [that] deny, re- strict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). Courts over- seeing criminal cases in this Circuit have borrowed from the standard governing modification of protective orders in civil cases, in which there is a “strong pre- sumption against the modification of a protective or- der.” In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011). See, e.g., United States v. Kerik, No. 07 Cr. 1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (ap- plying civil standard for modification of protective or- der in criminal case and holding that modification of Rule 16 protective order is “‘presumptively unfair’ ” where a party reasonably relied upon the order); see also United States v. Calderon, No. 15 Cr. 25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017); United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (borrowing from the standard for “good cause” under Fed. R. Civ. P 26(c) when evaluating whether to DOJ-OGR-00019635