DOJ-OGR-00019652.jpg

Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page6 of 23 does not appear to dispute that Judge Nathan’s order satisfies the first two conditions." Instead, the government focuses on the third condition, arguing that Ms. Maxwell can appeal Judge Nathan’s order after her criminal jury trial. Ans.Br. 16. But the government can make this argument only by obscuring the relief Ms. Maxwell actually seeks. To be clear, Ms. Maxwell seeks permission to share with Judge Preska and this Court, under seal, just what the government obtained iy ‘Perhaps suggesting that Judge Nathan’s order is not “final,” the government notes that the order “did not end the entire litigation as to [Ms. | Maxwell. To the contrary, [Ms.] Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in December 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021.” Ans.Br. 14. This is just a truism, as no one disputes that “Judge Nathan’s Order did not end the entire litigation.” If it had, Ms. Maxwell would have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But it is because “Judge Nathan’s Order did not end the entire litigation” that Ms. Maxwell invokes the collateral order doctrine as a basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. And in evaluating the applicability of that doctrine, the government does not appear to dispute that Judge Nathan’s order “conclusively determined the disputed question”: Whether the criminal protective order should be modified. That is all “finality” requires in the collateral order context. DOJ-OGR-00019652