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Extracted Text (OCR)
Cased 20-08; COSGOnAEIN 3DScOMEent4G51 , BIlEGH3ING/ age Ragef 71 ob 9
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would be forced to wait years for the defendant’s return.
As the Government has repeatedly emphasized, the strong possibility that the defendant
could successfully resist extradition only heightens the defendant’s incentive to flee. (Dkt. No.
100 at 19-20). Indeed, in rejecting the defendant’s offer in the Second Bail Motion to execute
anticipatory extradition waivers, the Court noted, among other things, “the likelihood that any
extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process.” (Dec. Op. at 13). The Court further noted
that the “likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any extradition requests—even
if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition entirely—weighs strongly in favor
of detention.” (/d.). That statement remains true even if the face of the defendant’s newest offer
to renounce her foreign citizenship.
As this Court previously found, the defendant has substantial international ties, familial
and personal connections abroad, and owns at least one foreign property of significant value. (Dec.
Op. at 10-11). The defendant’s alleged willingness to renounce her foreign citizenship should not
fundamentally alter the Court’s conclusions.
2. The Court Should Reject the Defendant’s Proposed Monitorship Condition
Next, the defendant has offered to place a portion of her and her spouse’s assets into a new
account that “will be monitored by a retired federal District Court judge and former United States
Attorney who will function as asset monitor and will have co-signing authority over the account.”
(Mot. at 2). This proposed condition—the details of which are vague—is insufficient to ensure
that the defendant appears in Court.
It first bears noting that the defendant’s finances—and her candor with the Court about
those finances— is not an issue of first impression. Significantly absent from the defendant’s
Motion is any attempt to address the Court’s determination that the defendant’s “lack of candor
raises significant concerns as to whether the Court has now been provided a full and accurate
picture of her finances and as to the Defendant’s willingness to abide by any set of conditions of
release.” (Dec. Op. at 16). That is critical because the value of any proposed monitorship would
depend entirely on the monitor having a completely accurate picture of the defendant’s finances
and access to all of her accounts and sources of wealth. Given the Court’s concerns about the
defendant’s candor, the Court should hesitate before trusting the defendant to be transparent with
a monitor under her employ.
In any event, even if the Court were to accept the defendant’s representations about her
assets at face value, the defendant’s proposal would leave the defendant with significant assets
unrestrained. In particular, the defendant’s proposal does not in any way restrain her $2 million
townhouse in London, which she could live in or sell to support herself. Although the defendant
asserts that the monitor would oversee any account into which the proceeds of the sale of the
defendant’s properties were deposited, the defendant does not explain how the monitor—or this
Court—would have the authority to force the defendant to deposit foreign assets in a domestic
account. As the Government has previously explained, the Government cannot realistically
recover assets abroad. Accordingly, the defendant’s proposal would leave her with access to at
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