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4 “The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). That responsibility, borne by NACDL’s members, requires defense counsel to explain the benefits and drawbacks of a plea agreement to their clients. As a practical matter, every criminal defendant hopes that a plea agreement will end their exposure to future prosecution for the same or related conduct. Defense counsel must explain to their clients that while a plea agreement ensures that the client is not charged for the same or related conduct in that district, most plea agreements expose the client to prosecution in other districts. It creates an impossible situation if defense counsel must now explain to their clients that the court may later excuse the Department from its promises. Guilty pleas must be knowing and voluntary. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). As the Court has explained, “[i]t is precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary ... that the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137-38 (2009). A “guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). A plea “is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional DOJ-OGR-00000204