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Case 22-1426, Document “Tate |. 3475900, Page169 of 208 | A-165 | Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 28 of 34 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) (collecting cases). The Court therefore denies Maxwell’s motion to dismiss multiplicitous counts without prejudice. VIL. The parties shall negotiate all remaining disclosures Maxwell moves to compel the Government to produce certain documents she believes it has in its possession and has failed to produce. She also seeks accelerated disclosure of the Government’s witness list, Jencks Act material, Brady and Giglio material, co-conspirator statements, and Rule 404(b) material. Based on the Government’s response in briefing and letters the parties have since submitted to the Court, it appears that most of these requests have been overtaken by events. Accordingly, although the Court concludes that Maxwell is not entitled to expedite this discovery based on the arguments in her motion papers, the Court will require the parties to confer on an overall schedule for all remaining pretrial disclosures. A. The Court accepts the Government’s representations that it has disclosed all Brady and Giglio Material The Supreme Court’s decisions in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) require the Government to disclose to defendants certain evidence that will aid their defense. Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Under Giglio, the Government has a duty to produce “not only exculpatory material, but also information that could be used to impeach a key government witness.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). Asa general rule, “Brady and its progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material upon request by a defendant.” /d. at 146. “[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law simply because it did not produce the evidence sooner.” /d. at 144. 28 DOJ-OGR-00020787