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Case 22-1426, Document “Tata | 3475900, Page197 of 208 | A-193 | 93 no indication that Maxwell was even a subject of the Florida investigation. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars only successive prosecution or punishment for the same offense, and Maxwell has endured neither. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the charges against her. Despite facing no prior prosecution or punishment herself, Maxwell contends that she is immune from prosecution because Epstein was already punished for the same conspiracy. The cases she cites, however, deal with successive prosecutions of a particular defendant for the same conspiracy, not separate prosecutions of individual co-conspirators. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 356 F.3d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 2004). The Double Jeopardy Clause does not require all co- conspirators be tried together for related offenses. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993); United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002, 1014 (2d Cir. 1976). Whether the Government could have charged Epstein again in this case has nothing to do with Maxwell’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Maxwell finally points to one case in which the Second Circuit held that a subsequent prosecution might not be permissible against a defendant whose charges were dismissed after her husband pleaded guilty. Dkt. No. 293 at 19 (citing United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979)). However, the Court agrees with the Government that the result in Cambindo Valencia rested on the terms of the husband’s plea agreement, not the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 638. No precedent stands for the proposition that an uncharged co-conspirator is put in jeopardy when another co-conspirator accepts a non-prosecution agreement. This is the first case in which Maxwell will be put in jeopardy for these offenses, and so this prosecution does not put her in jeopardy a second time. DOJ-OGR-00020815