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Case 22-1426, Document 58_02/28/2023, 3475901, Page147 of 221 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 30 of 40 impartial juror in such a trial. That is not the law, nor should it be. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1996) (“To hold that no rape victim could ever be an impartial juror in a rape trial would, we think, insult not only all rape victims but also our entire jury system.”); Buckner v. Davis, 945 F.3d 906, 914-15 (Sth Cir. 2019) (affirming conclusion that juror who failed to disclose childhood abuse was not impliedly biased in conviction for sexual assault of a child). Thus, the Court finds no basis to infer that Juror 50 is biased. The Defendant’s arguments to the contrary do not disturb the Court’s conclusion that Juror 50 was neither impliedly nor inferably biased. First, the Defendant argues that Juror 50 was impliedly biased because of multiple “dishonest answers.” Maxwell Br. at 36; Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 11.8 But this is not a case involving a juror’s extreme deceit due to a desire to be selected. By contrast, in United States v. Daugerdas, on which the Defendant extensively relies, a juror “created a totally fictitious persona in her drive to get on the jury.” 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015). The court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, emphasizing the “deliberate lies engineered to create a fictitious, ‘marketable’ juror” warranted “extraordinary relief.” /d. at 468. Such is not the case here. The Court credits Juror 50’s explanation that his nondisclosure was an “inadvertent mistake,” not intentional deception. Hearing Tr. at 14-15. Juror 50 explained how the circumstances surrounding his completion of the questionnaire—including his recent romantic breakup, that he had no expectation of being selected, the technical issues and ensuing long wait to begin the questionnaire, and the generally distracting environment—resulted in his “skimming” the questionnaire and missing the personal 8 The Defendant argued that these repeated lies included Juror 50’s use of social media in her pre-hearing briefing. Maxwell Br. at 36. For the reasons stated in this Court’s February 25 Opinion, that Juror 50 used social media accounts after the completion of trial does not establish that he lied about having been inactive on social media before trial. Feb. 25, 2020 Op. & Order, at 9-10. 30 DOJ-OGR-00020973