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12 does not bind any other federal, state, or local prosecuting authorities, nor does it prohibit any civil or administrative proceeding against the defendant or any property.” United States v. Barnes, No. 3:19-cr-00112-K, ECF No. 355 (Apr. 1, 2022), at 7. 3. The consistent practice of USAQs to limit the scope of plea agreements stands in stark contrast to the scope of the NPA here. The trial court correctly noted that “[nJationwide, unlimited agreements are the rare exception.” (App. at 56a). The fact that this NPA is a “rare exception” to Department’s general practice does not void the agreement’s broad reach. In fact, the rarity of nationwide agreements is a persuasive reason to enforce it because there can be no question that the choice of language was intentional and a key part of the parties’ bargain. This situation is no different than a contractual provision that binds a corporate subsidiary and, by extension, the parent corporation. Unless the subsidiary plainly lacked authority to enter into the agreement, that provision is enforceable against the parent. Similarly, one USAO has the authority to bind the entire Department. “(T]he prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Recognizing that one prosecutor can bind all prosecutor, the Justice Manual instructs prosecutors that non-prosecution agreements should “be drawn in DOJ-OGR-00000212