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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page34 of 113 Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976)). But, as Gebbie explained, Annabi misread this Court’s precedent and fashioned an “illogical” rule out of whole cloth: The first case cited in Annabi is Abbamonte, but Abbamonte merely relies upon the other two cases cited in Annabi—Alessi and Papa ... The court in Alessi relies upon Papa, which is a related case. ... Papa, however, provides no support for the rule the Second Circuit follows. ... Although Papa held that the plea agreement did not bind other districts because the evidence revealed an intent to bind only one district, the Second Circuit apparently has broadly interpreted this case as meaning that plea agreements do not bind other districts absent an affirmative appearance of doing so. Papa does not explain or attempt to rationalize the rule that has evolved. 294 F.3d at 547-48 (brackets and italics in original; bold added). Annabi stands in tension with what the United States Supreme Court has written about plea and immunity agreements. In Santobello, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)—the seminal case on plea bargaining—the Supreme Court held that one prosecutor’s promise in a plea agreement would bind other prosecutors, even those who might have been unaware of the promise. As Santobello explained, “[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done.” 404 U.S. at 262. And in Giglio v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an Assistant United Stated Attorney (“AUSA”) had a duty under Brady to disclose a promise of immunity that another AUSA had made to a testifying witness, even though the first AUSA had been falsely assured that DOJ-OGR-00021081