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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page43 of 113 this result would bring the Eleventh Circuit in line with every circuit that has directly confronted this question (other than the Second Circuit). See Gebbie, 294 F.3d at 550; Van Thournout, 100 F.3d at 594; Harvey, 791 F.2d at 303.8 Because the NPA was almost certainly negotiated with Eleventh Circuit law in mind, it would be unfair to impose another circuit’s minority rule of construction. A plea agreement must be enforced in accordance with the parties’ reasonable expectations. See Paradiso v. U.S., 689 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The dispositive question is what the parties to [the] plea agreement reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.”) (quoting U.S. v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979)). And as this Court has observed, “[p]arties entering a contract will expect ... that the provisions of the contract will be binding”; “[t]heir expectations should not be disappointed by application of [a local rule] which would strike down the contract or a provision thereof ....”. Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Restatement § 188 cmt b). Here, application of Second Circuit law would render the co- conspirator provision unenforceable—“strike [it] down”—in every federal district but one. It would ambush the parties with the law of a circuit that they did not 8° Alternatively, the NPA might be governed by Florida state law. It is ultimately irrelevant whether this Court applies Florida or Eleventh Circuit law. Florida courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, would look to the weight of authority on this topic. See, e.g., Brazeail v. State, 821 So.2d 364 (Fla. App. 2002) (following the “overwhelming weight of authority” among federal circuits on a question of federal law). As noted, the weight of authority rejects Annabi. 28 DOJ-OGR-00021090