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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page45 of 113 (“[D]ue process requires that the government adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity agreement it makes”); Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300 (“[C]onstitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the Government to a greater degree of responsibility...for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements”). Thus, when the Government promises immunity on behalf of “the United States,” in a legal context where such promise will be construed to mean nationwide immunity, this Court should ensure that the Government keeps its promise in accordance with the law of the place where it was made. 3. Annabi does not apply to Count Six because that count falls wholly within the timeframe contemplated by the NPA Even if Second Circuit law applied, Annabi’s rule of construction is subject to an important caveat: the new charges must be “sufficiently distinct” from those resolved by the plea “to warrant application of [the] rule.” 771 F.2d at 672. “TSJufficiently distinct,” in this context, means at least partially encompassing a different time period. /d. Because Count Six relates to a timeframe wholly swallowed by the NPA, (A144), Annabi does not apply to that count. The paragraph within which Annabi articulates its “sufficiently distinct” standard responded to an argument by the defendants that included references to the Double Jeopardy Clause. The paragraph from Annabi reads, in pertinent part (and with context supplied), as follows: 30 DOJ-OGR-00021092