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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Paged4 of 113 regarding the parties’ intent. To the extent that extrinsic materials do not make the parties’ intent clear, the Court is obligated to make a finding as to the parties’ by “reasonable understanding,” with ambiguities resolved in Maxwell’s favor. See United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App’x 268 at 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis and citation omitted). Courts in this circuit have routinely recognized the need for evidentiary hearings where the existence or scope of such agreements is in genuine dispute. See, e.g., id. at 270 (noting testimony from defendant’s attorney); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2002) Annabi, 771 F.2d at 671 (noting that district court heard testimony from two prosecutors, defendant, and defendant’s counsel as of the time the plea agreement was reached); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing “two evidentiary hearings”); United States v. Sattar, 2003 WL 22510398, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (noting conclusion that “an evidentiary hearing was warranted . . . to determine whether an agreement existed, what its terms were, and whether there was compliance with those terms”’). At a minimum, a hearing should have been held here, as was the case in Annabi, itself, and Papa to ascertain the parties’ intent. It is submitted that such a hearing would have established that Epstein intended tat any co-conspirators would 39 DOJ-OGR-00021101