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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page63 of 113 another person.” see U.S. v. Pham, No. 12-cr-423, 2022 WL 993119, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2022) (Nathan, J.) (“$3286(b)’s use of the terms ‘foreseeable’ and ‘commission of such offense’ ... dictate a case-specific approach.”’). It is noteworthy that the District Court could not identify a single page of legislative history supporting its expansive interpretation of § 3283. But that did not deter it from asserting, without citation to primary authority, that, when Congress extended the statute of limitations, it “evinced a general intention to cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.” A144. This questionable statement ultimately derives from a Third Circuit opinion, U.S. v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2015), which itself quotes an Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010). Dodge, however, had nothing to do with § 3283. Instead, Dodge addressed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), a completely different statute passed years after the relevant amendment to § 3283. Worse still, the full quote from Dodge is a comment about SORNA’s ¢ext, not its legislative history. See Dodge, 597 F.3d at 1355 (“Our review of the language of SORNA confirms our conclusion that Congress cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the Third Circuit—and, by extension, the District Court—grossly misread Dodge and conjured up a legislative history for § 3283 that does not exist. If anything, § 3283’s legislative history 48 DOJ-OGR-00021110