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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page65 of 113 (emphasis added). Weingarten does not move the needle because it did not purport to decide how § 3283 should actually be construed. The District Court’s reliance on Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), a case interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), was likewise misplaced. The District Court cited Nijhawan for the proposition that “the word ‘involves’ generally means courts should look to the circumstances of an offense as committed in each case.” A148. But Nijhawan says otherwise; there, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior case law holding that statutory “language, covering ‘crime[s]’ that ‘involv/e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’ ... refers to crimes as generically defined.” 557 U.S. at 36 (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007)).'° Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the clause, “offense that ... involves fraud or deceit,” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), is analyzed categorically, directly contrary to the District Court’s apparent misreading of Nijhawan. Compare Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 483 (“employ[ing] a categorical approach”) with A148. This Court should decline to ratify the District Court’s case-specific approach for an additional reason: it would conflict with at least two other circuits that have examined § 3283 and concluded that a categorical approach applies. See 0 In Johnson v. U.S., the Supreme Court overruled James on other grounds, but expressly reaffirmed James’ categorical approach. See 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015). 50 DOJ-OGR-00021112