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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page/1 of 113 Although the District Court was correct to recognize that Congress deleted the retroactivity provision purposefully, it failed to understand the reason. The District Court relied on a floor statement by Senator Leahy, in which the Senator offered his own reasons for opposing the retroactivity clause: I am pleased that the conference agreed to drop language from the original House-passed bill that would have extended the limitations period retroactively. That language, which would have revived the government’s authority to prosecute crimes that were previously time- barred, is of doubtful constitutionality. 149 Cong. Rec. $5147. Based on this, the District Court theorized that Congress wanted only to ensure that the extended statute of limitations would not unconstitutionally revive time-barred claims. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610 (2003). But Stogner is an unilluminating lens through which to analyze Sen. Leahy’s remark, as that case was not decided until after the PROTECT Act was passed. And though Stogner established, for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes, a clear division between statutes that revive time-barred prosecutions and those that merely extend the time to bring prosecutions not time-barred, this dichotomy would not have been apparent to Congress before Stogner. Indeed, the Stogner majority felt it necessary to clarify that its holding did “not prevent the State from extending time limits...for prosecutions not yet time barred,” 539 U.S. at 632, while the dissent contended that this dichotomy was untenable, see id. at 650 56 DOJ-OGR-00021118