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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page/2 of 113 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Congress could not have known which point of view would carry the day; Sen. Leahy may very well have thought that any retroactive application of the statute would be of doubtful constitutionality. In any event, Sen. Leahy’s remark confirms that Congress’s rejection of the provision was intentional—that it did not merely “agree to disagree,” as in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 623—his reasons why the provision was rejected cannot be ascribed to other members of Congress. See Garcia v. U.S., 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (noting floor statements by a single member are generally weak legislative history evidence). Indeed, we know that when Congress rejected the retroactivity provision in the 2003 House bill it almost certainly did not do so for constitutional- avoidance reasons. We know this because other criminal statutes of limitation passed by Congress contained language identical to the retroactivity provision that Congress rejected in the 2003 amendment to § 3283. See Pub.L. 107-56, § 809, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (note to 18 U.S.C. § 3286) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section.”); Pub.L. 101-647, § 2505, 104 Stat. 4789 (Nov. 29, 1990) (note to 18 U.S.C. § 3293) (similar). For these reasons, applying § 3283 retroactively fails under step one of Landgraf. 57 DOJ-OGR-00021119