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Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page/6 of 113 run afoul of ‘familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.’” Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., majority opinion but “[s]peaking only for [him]self’) (quoting Landgraf, 511 USS. at 270). The authority cited by the District Court is not to the contrary. In Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995), a civil case, the Court concluded that an amendment to a statute of limitations applied retroactively because it was procedural. id. at 891, But in Enterprise, Judge Cabranes—writing for a unanimous Court—retreated altogether from Vernon’s prior characterization of statutes of limitations as purely “procedural.” As Judge Cabranes wrote, Vernon “did not create a categorical exception [for statutes of limitations] from Landgraf’s presumption against retroactive application of legislation.” 391 F.3d at 409. Most importantly for this case, Enterprise indicated that an extension of the statute of limitations may operate with impermissible retroactive effect when it applies to pre-enactment conduct, regardless of whether or not it revives claims that are altogether time-barred. See id. at 410. Finally, The District Court also relied on decisions from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which—in tension with the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Richardson,—concluded that §3283 can be applied retroactively. See U.S. v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 61 DOJ-OGR-00021123