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Case 22-1426, Document ON IT 3536038, Page213 of 258 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 211 of 348 managers required more effort than in other offices, where a line AUSA can more easily just stop by a supervisor’s office to discuss a case.7°’ Second, key personnel were absent at varying times. Menchel’s last day in the office was August 3, 2007, the day he sent to the defense his letter making the initial offer, and presumably in the immediate period before his departure date, Menchel would have been trying to wrap up his outstanding work. Yet, this was also the time when Acosta was deciding how to resolve the matter. Similarly, in the critical month of September, the NPA and plea negotiations intensified and the NPA evolved significantly, with the USAO having to consider multiple different options as key provisions were continuously added or modified while Villafafia pressed to meet her late- September deadline. Although Lourie was involved with the negotiations during this period, he was at the same time transitioning not only to a new job but to one in Washington, D.C., and was traveling between the two locations. Sloman was on vacation in the week preceding the signing, when many significant changes were made to the agreement, and he did not participate in drafting or reviewing the NPA before it was signed. Accordingly, during the key negotiation period for a significant case involving a unique resolution, no one involved had both a thorough understanding of the case and full ownership of the decisions that were being made. Villafafia certainly felt that during the negotiations, she was only implementing decisions made by Acosta. Acosta, however, told OPR that when reviewing the NPA, “I would have reviewed this for the policy concerns. Did it do the... bullet points, and my assumption, rightly or wrongly, would have been that Andy and Marie would have looked at this, and that this was . . . appropriate.” The consequences flowing from the lack of ownership and effective communication can be seen in the NPA itself. As demonstrated by the contemporaneous communications, the negotiations were at times confusing as the parties considered multiple options and even revisited proposals previously rejected. Meanwhile, Villafafia sought to keep to a deadline that would allow her to charge Epstein when she had planned to, if the parties did not reach agreement. In the end, Acosta accepted several terms with little apparent discussion or consideration of the ramifications. The USAO’s agreement not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators” is a notable example. As previously noted, the only written discussion about the term that OPR found was Villafafia’s email to Lourie and the incoming West Palm Beach manager, with copies to her co-counsel and direct supervisor, stating that she did not believe the provision “hurts us,” and neither Acosta, Lourie, nor Villafafia recalled any further discussion about the provision. Although OPR did not find evidence showing that Acosta, Lourie, or Villafafia intended the scope of the provision to protect anyone other than Epstein’s four assistants, the plain language of the provision precluded the USAO from prosecuting anyone who engaged with Epstein in his criminal conduct, within the limitations set by the overall agreement. This broad prosecution declination would likely be unwise in most cases but in this case in particular, the USAO did not have a sufficient investigative basis from which it could conclude with any reasonable certitude that there were no other individuals who should be held accountable along with Epstein or that evidence might not be developed implicating others. Prosecutors rarely promise not to prosecute unidentified third 20 In his OPR interview, Acosta commented that although Menchel’s office was on the same floor as Acosta’s, he was in a different suite, which “affects interaction.” 185 DOJ-OGR-00021385