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Case 22-1426, Document ON 313 3536038, Page215 of 258 Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 213 of 348 from Villafafia and others, but given the highly unusual procedure being considered, his decision should have been made only after a full consideration of all of the possible ramifications and consequences of pushing the matter into the state court system, with which neither Villafafia nor the other subjects had experience, along with consideration of the legal and evidentiary issues and possible means of overcoming those issues. OPR did not find evidence indicating that such a meeting or discussion with the full team was held before the decision was made to pursue the state-based resolution, before the decision was made to offer a two-year term of incarceration, or before the NPA, with its unusual terms, was signed. As Acosta later recognized and told OPR, “And a question that I think is a valid one in my mind is, did the focus on, let’s just get this done and get a jail term, mean that we didn’t take a step back and say, let’s evaluate how this train is moving?” Many features of the NPA were given inadequate consideration, including core provisions like the term of incarceration and sexual offender registration, with the result that Epstein was able to manipulate the process to his benefit. Members of his senior staff held differing opinions about some of the issues that Acosta felt were important and that factored into his decision-making. There does not seem to be a point, however, at which those differing opinions were considered when forming a strategy; rather, Acosta seems to have made a decision that everyone beneath him followed and attempted to implement but without a considered strategy beyond attaining the three core elements. As the U.S. Attorney, Acosta had authority to proceed in this manner, but many of the problems that developed with the NPA might have been avoided with a more thoughtful approach. As Acosta belatedly recognized, “[I]f I was advising a fellow U.S. Attorney today, I would say, think it through.””°? No one of the individual problems discussed above necessarily demonstrates poor judgment by itself. However, in combination, the evidence shows that the state-based resolution was ill conceived from the start and that the NPA resulted from a flawed decision-making process. From the time the USAO opened its investigation, Acosta recognized the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein, yet after that investigation had run for more than a year, he set the investigation on a path not originally contemplated. Having done so, he had responsibility for ensuring that he received and considered all of the necessary information before putting an end to a federal investigation into serious criminal conduct. Acosta’s failure to adequately consider the full ramifications of the NPA contributed to a process and ultimately a result that left not only the line AUSA and the FBI case agents dissatisfied but also caused victims and the public to question the motives of the prosecutors and whether any reasonable measure of justice was achieved. Accordingly, OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment in that he chose a course of action that was in marked contrast to the action that the Department would reasonably expect an attorney exercising good judgment to take. 259 In commenting on OPR’s draft report, Acosta’s attorney acknowledged that “[t]he matter would have benefited from more consistent staffing and attention.” 187 DOJ-OGR-00021387