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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page30 of 93 17 Court should affirm the denial of Maxwell’s motions to dismiss. 1. Maxwell Is Not Entitled to Enforce the NPA As an initial matter, Maxwell has no right to invoke the protections of the NPA. Maxwell was not a signa- tory to the agreement. While the third-party benefi- ciary doctrine is a tenet of contract law (Br.16), its ap- plication to plea agreements under federal law is a sep- arate question because plea agreements differ from commercial contracts in meaningful respects. United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We have long recognized that plea agreements are significantly different from commercial contracts.”). It is doubtful that a third-party beneficiary can enforce a plea agreement. See United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing that “we are unaware of authority” supporting application of “third party beneficiary principles ... to a plea agreement in a criminal case”); United States v. Mariamma Viju, No. 15 Cr. 240, 2016 WL 107841, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) (explaining that “[t]he right to enforce a plea deal does not exist for its own sake; rather, it is a means to achieve fairness in plea bargaining,” and “en- forcement by third parties adds nothing to protecting the defendant’s right”). In any event, even under the third-party benefi- ciary law on which Maxwell relies (Br.16), she would have to show that “the original parties intended the [agreement] to directly benefit [her] as [a] third part[y].” United States v. Wilson, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 2000) (assuming without deciding that third DOJ-OGR-00021677