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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page36 of 93 23 Florida, such as the USAO-SDFL’s “contact with wit- nesses in New York.” (Br.38). These disparate and un- connected events do not show that the USAO-SDFL acted on behalf of the entire federal government when entering into the NPA, or that Epstein understood the USAO-SDFL to be doing so. Maxwell also advances several arguments attempt- ing to minimize or side-step this Court’s precedent. For example, Maxwell argues that Annabi applies only if the charges in the indictment are “sufficiently distinct” from the counts resolved by the earlier agreement. (Br.30-33 (quoting 771 F.2d at 672)). Not so. The rele- vant portion of Annabi concerned an argument by the defendants that in seeking to have a plea agreement in the Eastern District of New York bar the pending charges in the Southern District of New York, they were “seeking only the same protection accorded by thle Double Jeopardy] Clause.” 771 F.2d at 672. This Court rejected that argument, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause applied (notwithstanding that the defendants were “never in jeopardy” on those charges in the Eastern District), the defendants would not be entitled to relief because the pending charges “extended for an additional two years” and thus were “not the same as the charges that were dismissed.” Id. Thus, Annabi did not hold that its rule—that “[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction,” id.—applies only if the charges are sufficiently distinct. And as Judge Nathan recognized, “no subsequent Second Circuit case applying Annabi has so held.” (A.191). DOJ-OGR-00021683